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be found in Thomas Isern's examination of 
harvesting techniques and technology on the 
North American plains.1 As well, no effort seems 
to have been made to locate and photo-docu-
ment extant examples of the products of these 
firms for inclusion in the book. Here again, there 
certainly is no lack of evidence from which 
to choose, since public collections on the prai-
ries are rife with this material that, because it 
was often produced locally, is reasonably well 
documented. 
At times the authors also display a discon-
certing lack of understanding of the technology 
itself. Using a quotation from a 1932 source (by 
which time nostalgia for steam power had al-
ready taken root), reference is made to early 
self-propelled steam engines as "huge ma-
chines" (p. 89). This is inaccurate and does much 
to perpetuate the myth of "mammoth technol-
ogy" on the prairies. Although some steam en-
gines were enormous, their size and cost would 
have limited their use mostly to bonanza farms. 
Just as all farmers today do not operate John 
Deere four-wheel-drive tractors, all farmers 
around 1900 did not use 100 HP Case steam trac-
tion engines. 
It is also dangerous to refer to the era of steam 
technology on the prairies as being cohesive 
when in fact it was made up of at least two quite 
different sub-periods, involving quite different 
steam technology. The authors go on to suggest 
that steam was faster and cheaper than the avail-
able alternatives such as "animal treadmills," 
neglecting the 10- and 12-horse sweeps that for 
a time truly did provide an alternative for thresh-
ing purposes. 
This example illustrates the problems that 
can occur when one does not engage in origi-
nal research but rather reworks the existing his-
toriography; the error regarding horse power 
was copied from Spector. The problem occurs 
when they misconstrue David Spector's com-
ment (p. 152)2 regarding internal combustion 
tractors and water. The point was not that "they 
did not need water to operate" (p. 90) - as many 
were water-cooled, they obviously did - but 
rather that they did not require the quantity of 
water necessary with a steam boiler. Similarly 
questionable is the authors' interpretation of 
the invention of the manure spreader, attributed 
to a farmer near Stratford, Ontario, who sold 
out to IHC prior to World War I (p. 198). Were 
one unfamiliar with the actual chronology of 
events, one might not be aware upon reading 
this book that firms on both sides of the inter-
national border had been manufacturing ma-
nure spreaders before 1900. 
Given the richness of the subject matter, one 
would wish this book to whet the appetite for 
further in-depth research. Unfortunately, rather 
than teasing and prompting, it frustrates. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the prai-
rie implement-manufacturing industry, there 
must be much more consideration given to the 
significance of the material culture and the moti-
vation behind its creation. In this presentation 
it seems bland and colourless, and I am sure that 
the reality could not be farther from the truth. 
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The Course of Industrial Decline traces the 
history of the Boott Cotton Mills of Lowell, 
Massachusetts, from its founding in 1835 to its 
closure in 1955. It is a long story, and a depress-
ing one. Gross characterizes the typical Lowell 
cotton company as a corporation which "devot-
ed itself entirely to financial success, denied 
reciprocal responsibility to its employees, and 
left their care when unneeded to their families 
or public agencies" (p. 12). Gross's primary the-
sis is that the ultimate failure of the Boott Mills, 
and by implication of the New England cotton 
industry, was due not to any inherent flaws in 
the company or its employees but to a decision 
by the firm's proprietors to use it as a cash cow 
with all profits to be invested elsewhere. As a 
result it was, through most of its history, tech-
nologically obsolete, and survived only through 
the dedication of its managers and the exploita-
tion of its work force. 
The Boott was the eighth of nine major cotton 
companies formed at Lowell by a tightly knit 
group of Boston capitalists between 1825 and 
1840. The early history of Lowell as an indus-
trial city is well known and justly regarded as a 
key stage in the development of industry, indus-
trial labour, and corporate organization in Amer-
ica. The significance of these developments is 
recognized in Lowell National Historical Park, 
which commemorates Lowell as a pioneer 
and symbol in the industrial revolution in Amer-
ica. The surviving Boott mills form a part of the 
park, and the author has conducted research 
on the mills under contract with the National 
Parks Service. The book under review doubt-
less owes something to this earlier research but 
it is an independent work, not a product of the 
National Parks Service. 
Gross passes over the early history of Low-
ell and the Boott quickly; his focus is not on the 
Golden Age of Lowell but on the century fol-
lowing the Civil War when the processes that 
started with such promise in Lowell worked 
themselves out. 
During the last three decades of the nine-
teenth century the Boott paid regular dividends, 
but apparent prosperity masked growing prob-
lems. The New England cotton industry was 
being pressed by southern cotton companies 
with lower labour costs and newer, more effi-
cient mills. After the 1870s the owners of the 
Boott failed completely to re-invest in new build-
ings and were slow to replace equipment. By 
1902 a consultant reported that the buildings 
were beyond adaptation and should all be com-
pletely replaced. The recommendations, like 
many similar ones, were ignored. In 1905, follow-
ing a crisis in the industry, the company was re-
organized as Boott Mills. The re-organization 
changed little. The obsolete buildings remained 
in use for another 50 years and equipment 
remained outdated. Profitability was main-
tained by the "speed up" and the "stretch out," 
demanding more of workers while keeping 
wages so low that the mill could not retain its 
best workers. The company also benefited from 
a remarkably dedicated and able manager, 
Frederick Flather, and his two sons, who ran 
the mill for 50 years. Flather, an admirer of F.W. 
Taylor's scientific management theories, was 
not technically expert in the cotton industry but 
he had executive ability and was adept in ex-
ploiting niche markets. Most important, he was 
dedicated to the survival of the company; there 
is little doubt that he prolonged the Boott's exis-
tence by many years. What he could not do was 
persuade the mill owners to make the significant 
investment that the mill needed to be competi-
tive. By 1955 the Boott had reached the end of 
its course and, faced with a refusal by labour to 
accept a wage rollback, the owners shut the mill 
down. The remarkable thing is not that the com-
pany failed but that it survived as long as it did. 
As Flather wrote to a former employee, the clos-
ing was "fifty years overdue" (p. 239). 
Gross creates a richly textured and sympa-
thetic history of the company, describing the 
interplay of management, labour and technol-
ogy. He minimizes the traditional argument that 
competition with low-wage textile mills in the 
south doomed the New England mills and 
argues convincingly that both labour and man-
agement at the Boott fought an uphill battle to 
compensate for the antiquated mill buildings 
and outdated equipment imposed by the own-
ers. If there is a weakness in his account of the 
company, it is in his portrait of the proprietors. 
They remain a largely faceless and nameless 
group. There is little sense of what led them to 
follow a policy that, they were advised again 
and again, would cripple the mill in the long 
term. Gross would probably argue that the per-
sonalities and personal motivations of the own-
ers are not significant, for they were simply 
following principles which were inherent in 
the Lowell experiment and in much of modern 
economics: the absolute mobility of capital, the 
absence of any responsibility of capital to labour 
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beyond a daily wage, and the pursuit of com-
parative advantage. 
The work would also be stronger if the au-
thor could provide more detail as to how pro-
fitable the Boott was and where the profits were 
re-invested; Gross makes it clear that profits 
were not plowed back into the mill. It is proba-
ble that the figures are simply not available but, 
if they could be presented, they would make a 
strong case even more convincing. 
In his postscript Gross draws parallels be-
tween modern entrepreneurs, who are often 
criticized for "being devoted to the production 
of profits, not of goods" (p. 242), and the own-
ers of the Boott. He argues that the modern "plun-
derers" are not anomalies but are the legitimate 
descendants of the financiers who organized 
Lowell and the Boott. In short, Gross turns a 
study of a defunct textile corporation into a con-
demnation of economic practices and theories 
that are widely accepted today and are inher-
ent in the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. How his thesis will be received and incor-
porated into the interpretation of Lowell is an 
interesting question. 
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In Make Room for TV: Television and the Fam-
ily Ideal in Postwar America, Lynn Spigel pre-
sents a social history of the new medium. Like 
both film and radio when they originated (and, 
for that matter, printed books), television did 
not become culturally integrated without con-
troversy over its possible benefits and dangers. 
Spigel focusses attention on public debates, 
both explicit and implicit, over the relation be-
tween television and family life at a time when 
the nuclear family itself was being transformed 
by rapid social and economic change. The first 
chapter is about popular notions of both home 
and entertainment that emerged between the 
Victorian period and the years following World 
War II. The rest of the book is about the contro-
versies that arose over specific problems asso-
ciated with television. On moral, practical and 
even aesthetic grounds, for example, some peo-
ple thought television would prove to be a ben-
eficial and unifying force in the home, while 
others thought it would prove to be a destruc-
tive and divisive one. Of interest to Spigel is not 
so much the merits of arguments on either side 
but the existence of these arguments. 
She refers to the latter as "discourses." I am 
irritated by her repetitive use of this word. But 
I would be troubled by her undisciplined and 
tendentious use of it in any case. Sometimes she 
refers simply to a debate or discussion. At other 
times, she refers to the specialized topic of a 
debate or discussion. At still other times, she 
refers to the "hidden agenda" of a debate or dis-
cussion. By now, it is no secret that discourse, 
especially when used in the plural and in this 
third sense, is a code word that identifies decon-
struction. The basic premises are that (1) real-
ity is known to us only through language; and 
(2) language is inherently subjective and biased: 
ergo (3) all forms of communication are cultur-
ally "constructed" (another dreadfully over-used 
word) to serve the special interests of some class 
and its "ideology" (a word she uses in the Marx-
ist sense). Scholarship is not properly the study 
of empirically verifiable and supposedly objec-
tive facts, therefore, but the deconstruction, or 
problematization, of value-laden discourses 
that purport to be value-free. Scepticism about 
language is hardly a new idea. What is new, how-
ever, is the idea that language is totally incapa-
ble of conveying information about the outside 
world. Taking this to its logical conclusion would 
not only undermine scholarship, of course, but 
subject deconstruction itself to the same cri-
tique. Advocates resort, therefore, to a kind of 
selective cynicism: they deconstruct only the 
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